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COMMENT.
DOES MALICIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT CONSTI-
TUTE A TORT?
Several cases have recently been decided in the United
States, which are interesting as showing the attitude of Amer-
ican courts toward the leading English case of Allyn v. Flood,
L. R. (1898) App. Cas. 1.
In that case, the discharge of an employ6 of the Glingall
Iron Co. was brought about by the action of defendant, the
delegate of a labor union, who told the officers of the Iron Co.
that the union men working for them would be called out
unless the plaintiff was discharged. The plaintiff, who was
thereupon discharged, brought an action against the delegate
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and two higher officers of the union, but it appeared that the
act of the delegate had been neither authorized nor adopted by
the officers, so the action as to them was discontinued. On
appeal to the House of Lords, the majority of the court held
that no legal right of the plaintiffs had been violated; that the
action of the defendant was not unlawful, there being no con-
tractual relations between the Iron Co. and the plaintiff; and
that the presence or absence of malice on part of defendant had
no effect in determining whether his conduct was lawful or
unlawful. The court below and a minority of the highest
court recognized a legal right in the plaintiff to pursue his call-
ing unmolested, and held that if defendant acted with malice,
or in other words without justifiable cause or excuse, in inter-
fering with such right, then such conduct was actionable.
It will be noticed that the element of combination or con-
spiracy is absent in this case, and several of the judges inti-
mated that the decision might be different if such elements were
present. But this point is now settled, so far as England is
concerned, by the case of Huttey v. Simmons, L. R. (1898) Q.
B. D. 181, which holds that the element of conspiracy does not
make that unlawful which, if done by one alone, would
be lawful.
In the United States, previous to Allyn v. Flood, the weight
of authority seems to favor the view taken by the minority in
that case. Lucke v. Clothing Assembly, 77 Md. 396, 26 Atl.
505; Curran v. Gahn, 152 N. Y. 33; Walker v. Cronin, 107
Mass. 555; see also, 11 Harvard Law Rev. 44,9; 228 Am.
Law Rev. 47.
The recent New York case of Natl. Protective Assn. v.
Cumming, 53.App. Div. 227, decided by the Supreme Court in
July, 1900, was an action brought by one labor union against
another, to enjoin the latter from in any way interfering with
the work or employment of any member of the plaintiff union.
The Supreme Court held that this case came within the princi-
ple of Allyn v. Flood, and reversed the decision of the Special
Term granting the injunction. It can hardly be said that this
case does come within the principle of Allyn v. Flood, inasmuch
as the additional element of conspiracy or combination is pres-
ent. But it does come within the principle of Huttey v. Sim-
mons, supra, which is the latest statement of the English rule.
This case, however, is not satisfactorily distinguished by the
Court from the previous New York case of Curran v. Gahn, su-
pra, which case is not in harmony with the recent English
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decisions, and we shall await the decision of the Court of
Appeals with interest.
The question has also arisen in Massachusetts in two cases
decided since Allyn v. Flood. The case of Plant v. Woods, 176
Mass. 492, decided in September, 1899, was an action brought
by one labor union to enjoin another labor union from any acts
tending to prevent members of plaintiff's union from securing
employment or continuing in employment. The Court recog-
nized the legal right of plaintiffs to pursue their calling unmo-
lested, and also reasserted the Massachusetts doctrine that the
presence or absence of malice may determine whether an act is
lawful or unlawful, thus reaching conclusions on these two
points contrary to those reached by the English court.
Holmes, C. J., dissents; but he does not deny the principle, he
merely denies the application of the principle to the case at bar.
He admits that if malice were present there would be a right
of action; but contends that malice was not present in this
case, inasmuch as the purpose of the defendants, which was to
strengthen their union, was justifiable.
Again, in Moran v. Dunphy, 59 N. E. 125, decision in January,
1901, the same Court goes a step further and holds that malic-
iously and without justifiable cause to induce a third person to
end his employment of the plaintiff, whether the inducement be
false slander or successful persuasion, is an actionable tort, and
that this principle applies whether the employment be by con-
tract or at will.
The decisions of the Massachusetts court seem much more
productive of justice to the employer than the English decis-
ions, but they make a classification of lawful and unlawful acts
in this connection very difficult. No general rule can be laid
down to decide whether the acts are lawful because justified by
competition or by the fact that the acts are done in connection
with one's property, and this question must therefore besettled
in each individual case as it comes up.
TAXATION OF STREET RAILWAY FRANCHISES.
A very important decision has recently been made by the
Supreme Court of Michigan. It concerns taxation of the
street railroads of Detroit, and is especially important because
the same question in various phases is pressing for decision in
many of the States.
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To compel street railroad corporations to make proper
returns in the way of taxation for the extraordinary privileges
conferred, is one of the most serious problems confronting
American municipalities. In the majority of instances, these
corporations do not equitably share the burden of taxation.
The injustice is usually effected by eliminating from the assess-
ment roll the value of the franchises, and taxing only the tan-
gible property of the corporation.
Only in recent years have these gigantic companies been
organized; since, in fact, the practical application of electricity
as the means of propulsion. In many of the courts of last
resort, the question, in its relation to street railroads, is one of
first impression, and in all the States the companies are vigor-
ously opposing what they claim to be a violation of their
constitutional rights.
We think the Michigan decision is the clearest pronounce-
ment yet received on this vexed and difficult question.
The facts of the case, in briefest form, are as follows: The
Board of Assessors of the City of Detroit assessed the street
railroad property for the year 1900 at $5,000,000, and this
assessment was confirmed by the council. Its previous assess-
ments were $800,000 for 1898, and $1,500,000 for 1899, on
practically the identical property. In mandamus proceedings
in the Circuit Court, the principal points urged by the relator
were (1) that there were illegally included in said valuation
several million dollars on account of franchises, and (2) that
no separation was made on the assessment roll of the valua-
tion placed on the franchises and the valuation placed on the
personal property of the relator.
It was contended by the relator that if the franchise is not
made taxable property by express statute, it cannot be taxed
indirectly by associating it with tangible property, and thus
increasing the value of the latter. This contention was not
sustained, and it was held that the property should be taxed
at its cash value, whatever it may be that causes or con-
tributes to such value.
There is manifest propriety in considering these aggrega-
tions of property as a unit, and within the unity of use is com-
prehended the value of the franchises. The market value of a
street railway company might be $10,000,000, while, if its
easements and franchises were disassociated, its tangible prop-
erty might sell for only $3,000,000. What a travesty on the
principle of equality of taxation to allow this burden to be
shifted by such a wrongful evasion.
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The decision of the Michigan court is fortified by the able
decisions of Justice Brewer and Chief Justice Fuller in Adams
Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor. In these cases it was held
that for purposes of taxation the value of the intangible prop-
erty must be included, and in some cases this would exceed the
aggregate value of the separate pieces of tangible property.
The lesson should be brought home to the assessors in
many States that it is an idle task to speculate on the value of
intangible franchises. These must be inseparably connected
with the tangible property, and earning power and cash
value are the important factors in determining the amount
of taxation.
LABOR UNION LEGISLATION-EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO DISCHARGE.
Theimportance of labor unions and the frequent legislation
concerning them make the case of Gillespie v. People, 58 N. E.
1009 (Ill.) worthy of note. In the interest of union men, a
statute was passed in Illinois similar to ones in several other
States, making it a misdemeanor to coerce a workingman into
leaving, or from joining, a union. The plaintiff discharged an
employ6 working by the day, because he belonged to a labor
union and declined to withdraw. Such a statute is deemed
unconstitutional, as it deprives the employer of property with-
out due process of law, and is a special act conferring privileges
upon union men. The same conclusion was reached upon prac-
tically the same state of facts in State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 169,
31 S. W. 781.
While not new in principle, it emphasizes the right of prop-
erty. The nearer courts come to the recognition of property as
itself a right over an object-which is the subject of property
and not, legally speaking, property itself-the greater become
the constitutional guarantees. It then becomes clear that the
right to contract is a property right, and under the Constitu-
tion inviolable. It involves the right to unmake as well as to
make contracts, regardless of motive, subject of course to rea-
sonable police regulation necessarily restrictive in its nature, of
which usury laws furnish an example.
Being guaranteed by the Constitution, the legislature is
prohibited from declaring that a crime without a hearing
which the Constitution permits. The employer can dismiss an
employ6 with or without reason, answerable, indeed in a civil
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action for the breach if any there be. The same liberty is
accorded the workingman, subject to the same limitations.
The decision of an inferior court in a famous strike case, com-
pelling workmen to continue in a receiver's employ, was over-
ruled because it involved an invasion of one's liberty to be
compelled to remain in the service of another, though the con-
certed withdrawal of many might seriously injure the public.
Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310.
The other contention, that the statute was a special law
conferring a special privilege on some out of a class, is not free
from doubt. Strictly, perhaps it is rather a restriction upon
employers than a privilege conferred on union men. Doubtless
the legislature meant to leave the employer free to discharge a
union man for any or no reason, except that he belonged to a
-union. Whatever privilege this gives to union men was
enjoyed by non-union already, and it rather equalizes their po-
sitions so far as discharge is concerned. Though its effect may
be indirectly to benefit union men, the statute operates on all
-workmen alike, and perhaps does not strictly fall within
special legislation.
Whether or not this is so, the result clearly shows that pa-
ternal legislation in behalf of labor organizations, so far, at
least, has not been considered by the courts to come within the
scope of the police regulating power of the State so as to per-
xnit legislation restricting the right and liberty of contract.
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